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SEASON’S GREETINGS
The staff at the Police Academy 
would like to wish our “In-
Service:10-8” readers and their 
families all the best for this 
holiday season. Once again, it 
has been a pleasure serving 
British Columbia’s police officers, and our other 
readers across Canada, by bringing them up-to-
date on many of the issues facing them daily as 
they go about protecting and serving the citizens of 
their communities. May you have a safe and 
blessed Christmas and all the best in 2009. And 
remember, “In God we trust…all others we run on 
CPIC!” 
POLICE INVESTIGATIVE 
TECHNIQUES & PROCEDURES 
CERTIFICATE PROGRAM
The Police Academy at the Justice Institute of British 
Columbia (JIBC) has developed and implemented a 
credit course series with an evaluation process in each 
course. Upon successful completion of the series of 
courses, learners will receive a JIBC Certificate of 
Achievement, called the Police Investigative 
Techniques and Procedures Certificate.
When learners complete this new 6 course, 30-day 
certificate, they will have the ability to apply an 
informed, modern approach to investigating criminal 
offences. Completion of the course will allow them to 
be assigned to investigate most criminal offences as 
well as broaden their understanding of investigative 
procedures and processes. This certificate is suited 
for officers who are currently serving, or are planning 
to enter, an investigative unit at either their home 
agency or as part of an integrated team.
The Rationale
The Academy has developed this Certificate as part of 
a four-pronged strategy:
1. Taking existing, well honed skills-based courses that 
are currently being delivered to serving police 
officers to create the Certificate, which may be 
able to ladder into a future degree path program. 
2. The Certificate will be a short, student/client-
centered credential that responds to the needs of 
officers and departments to have a credential that 
is focused on professional accreditation. 
3. The Certificate was created in response to the 
increasing need for officers to justify and 
articulate actions taken during the course of an 
investigation and for the JIBC to provide current, 
relevant training and education to front line officers 
charged with investigating serious crimes.
4. Officers who enrol in this program will be given 
credit for courses previously taken at the JIBC that 
are now contained in the Certificate program as well 
as be given exposure to other advanced courses 
being offered through the Police Academy.
This new JIBC certificate will be offered to serving 
members of all municipal and tribal police departments 
as well as members of the RCMP. Initially the 
certificate will be delivered at the JIBC’s New 
Westminster and Victoria Campuses. This may lead to 
the Certificate being offered on a more regional scale 
throughout western Canada at a later date. 
For further information on the Certificate Program 
please check out the Police Academy’s website:
www.jibc.ca/police
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e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“I have been getting your 
publication second hand 
for about a year. I really 
enjoy it. It is very well written and 
the entire content is extremely timely and useful. Keep 
up the great work!.” - Police Sergeant, Manitoba
*********
“I just encountered an old copy of your 
newsletter online while researching some 
case law for a student/friend and have 
spent most of my afternoon reading totally unrelated 
articles and cases of interest ... Thanks for a great 
publication.” - Park Warden, Saskatchewan
*********
“I love reading [In Service:10-8] and it 
keeps me up to date on all issues.  It’s an 
awesome resource.” - Police Detective, 
Ontario
*********
“I would like to be added to the 
distribution list for the “In Service:10-8” 
bulletin. Someone forwarded me a copy of 
[a previous] edition and I found it very interesting and 
well-written; I particularly appreciated the ‘Legally 
Speaking’ section.” - Criminal Investigations, Canada 
Border Services Agency, Quebec
*********
“[W]ould still appreciate being on the 
electronic mail list. Thanks again, and 
keep up the good work.  Obviously, lots of 
coppers, young and old, continue to seek info and can't 
always get it from their own agencies.” - Police 
Sergeant, Manitoba
www.10-8.ca
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IN-SERVICE LEGAL ROAD TEST
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge your 
understanding of the law. 
Each question is based on a case featured in this issue. 
See page 31 for the answers.
1. What was the most popular method to commit 
homicide in Canada in 2007?
 (a) Stabbing;
 (b) Shooting;
 (c) Beating;
 (d) Strangulation;
 (e) Fire.
 
2. Which province had the highest homicide rate in  
2007?
 (a) British Columbia;
 (b) Alberta;
 (c) Saskatchewan;
 (d) Manitoba;
 (e) Ontario;
 (f) Quebec.
 
3. A no knock entry pursuant to a s.11 of the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act search warrant requires 
prior-authorization by a Justice of the Peace to omit 
announcement.
 (a) True 
 (b) False
 
4. In assessing whether a police officer has reasonable 
grounds to make a breath demand it is an error for a 
judge to look at each indicia of impairment in 
isolation. 
 (a) True
 (b) False
5. The odour of freshly-smoked marihuana emanating 
from a vehicle objectively supports, at minimum, a 
reasonable suspicion that the driver and / or 
passenger are engaged in criminal activity 
(possession of marihuana). 
 (a) True
 (b) False
 
POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 10-13, 2011
Mark your calendars!!! The 
British Columbia Association 
of Chiefs of Police, the 
Ministry of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General, and the 
Justice Institute of British 
Columbia, Police Academy are hosting the Police 
Leadership 2011 Conference in Vancouver, British 
Columbia. This is Canada's largest police leadership 
conference and will provide an opportunity for 
delegates to discuss leadership topics presented by 
world-renowned speakers. 
www.policeleadershipconference.com
FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE ALONE, 
ABSENT AN EXPLANATION, 
PROVES GUILT
R. v. Blair, 2008 BCPC 270  
The accused was charged with breaking 
and entering a garage and committing 
theft. The garage, located on a very rural, 
ten acre parcel of land well outside the 
main city,  was adjacent to the road. The accused was 
not known to the owner of the property nor did he have 
an invitation or right to be on the property. His 
fingerprint was found just below a break in a window, 
which was believed to be the point of entry. The break 
in the window would provide access to a latch that, if 
lifted,  would allow the window to slide open. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the accused 
did not explain why his fingerprint was on the window. 
The judge concluded that the Crown had proven a prima 
facie case for conviction. Having done so, the judge 
drew an adverse inference from the accused’s failure 
to offer an explanation for the presence of his 
fingerprints and he was convicted.  
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
www.10-8.ca - www.10-8.ca
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KNOWLEDGE OF GUN UNDER 
DRIVER’s SEAT PROVEN BY 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
R. v. Ali, 2008 ONCA 741
Police searched the accused’s vehicle, in 
which he was the sole occupant, after he 
was apprehended driving a car a short 
distance from his home. They found a 
loaded, sawed-off 12 gauge shotgun under the 
driver's seat. The gun was resting on its side with the 
stock, which was not visible from the driver’s seat,  
facing towards the front of the driver's seat with 
the barrel pointed towards the back of the car. The 
gun was readily accessible by a simple reach of the 
driver. No further ammunition or associated 
paraphernalia was found in the car or in a later search 
of the accused’s home. 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
accused conceded he had the necessary degree of 
control over the shotgun to establish possession 
under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code, but his knowledge 
of the shotgun was not adequately proven. The trial 
judge disagreed. She rejected several alternative 
explanations the accused suggested in an effort to 
raise a reasonable doubt, instead inferring the 
accused knew the shotgun was under the driver's seat 
by considering the cumulative force of several items 
of circumstantial evidence, including:
• the gun was located under the driver's seat of 
the car in a position that would give the driver the 
most ready access to the stock of the firearm;
• the accused was the only person who drove the 
car on the day and evening prior to, and the day 
of, his arrest and the finding of the gun;
• the household routine was that the accused was 
the primary, if not the exclusive driver of the 
car; and  
• the inherent improbability of another person 
secreting the weapon under the driver's seat in 
light of the nature of the item and its ready 
visibility from the rear seat and window of the 
vehicle.
The accused was convicted of several firearms 
offences. 
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing the evidence failed to prove the 
critical element of knowledge of the presence of the 
sawed-off shotgun in the motor vehicle. The Court, 
however, disagreed. “The inference drawn by the trial 
judge of the essential element of knowledge was 
reasonably open to her on the evidence taken as a 
whole,” said the Court. “She did not impose upon the 
[accused] the burden of proving a reasonable or 
possible alternative explanation for the presence of 
the firearm in the motor vehicle.” The accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
DRIVING WITHOUT REASONABLE 
CONSIDERATION PROVEN BY 
WARN ON ASD 
R. v. Dahlquist, 2008 BCPC 241
 
The accused was stopped at a roadblock 
about midnight by police checking for 
driving infractions.  An officer 
immediately noted that his eyes were 
bloodshot and watery and he had a mild to moderate 
odour of liquor on his breath.  She read the accused 
the approved screening device demand and he blew a 
“Warn”, which indicated his blood alcohol level was 
between 50mg% and 100mg%. The officer issued a 
violation ticket under s.144(1)(b) of the Motor 
Vehicle Act, driving without reasonable consideration 
for other persons using the highway, and also served 
him with a s.215 Motor Vehicle Act 24 hour driving 
prohibition.  He surrendered his licence and his 
vehicle was towed away. The accused pled not guilty 
in British Columbia Provincial Court.  
 
At trial there was no direct evidence presented as to 
the accused’s driving ability. The trial judge, however, 
found that s.144(1)(b) focuses on the duty of care 
expected of a driver and not the actual manner of 
driving, as does s.144(1)(a). In deciding what the 
standard of care of a reasonable driver is in relation 
to driving and alcohol, JJP Gordon found it was s.215 
of the Motor Vehicle Act. In so deciding, the judge 
stated:
 
Section 215 provides for administrative penalties 
for drivers whose ability to drive are affected by 
alcohol.  The consequence of an officer having 
reasonable and probable grounds for believing a 
www.10-8.ca
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driver is affected by alcohol is a 
24 hour driving prohibition (an 
administrative penalty).  The 
Superintendant of Motor 
Vehicles may further 
administratively suspend the 
driver’s privileges as a result of 
the roadside suspension.   Can 
section 215 be considered a 
marker of the duty of a 
reasonable driver.
 
I conclude that it does.   I draw 
the inference that the 
Legislature has in effect 
legislated that the minimum standard of care of a 
reasonable person driving a motor vehicle on a 
highway is breached if the person drives with a 
blood alcohol level exceeding 50 mg of alcohol in 100 
ml of blood.  It is a legislative signal of the minimum 
duty of care of a driver, a breach of which is a 24 
hour driving prohibition and a possible lengthier 
suspension imposed by the Superintendant. [paras. 
11-12]
 
In concluding that an ASD warn was sufficient to 
found a conviction for driving without reasonable 
consideration, JJP Gordon stated: 
 
I conclude…that section 215 does set out a standard 
of care relevant to this case and that standard is 
breached if a person drives on a highway with a 
blood alcohol level of 0.05 or above.  The 
consequences imposed on a driver by the Legislature 
under section 215 are significant enough to signal 
that it is the duty of a driver, to no less than the 
others using the road, to not drive when the driver’s 
ability to do so is affected by alcohol.
 
A test of the breach of the duty, as set out in 
section 215, is whether a driver’s ability to drive is 
affected by alcohol.  If a police officer has 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that a 
driver’s ability is so affected, the officer may 
administratively prohibit that person from driving 
for a period of 24 hours (presumably, at least in 
part, to ensure that the effects of the alcohol have 
passed before the driver gets behind the wheel 
again).  This is the so-called 24 hour roadside 
suspension.
 
This case illustrates what can constitute those 
reasonable and probable grounds for the application 
of section 215: bloodshot and watery eyes, the 
odour of liquor on the breath and a reading on the 
ASD of at least 0.05.  
 
I find that it is a reasonable 
inference to draw that the 
Legislature has in effect 
legislated that the minimum 
standard of care of a 
reasonable driver using the 
highway is breached if the 
person drives while his or her 
ability to do so is affected by 
alcohol. It is sufficient evidence 
of being so affected if the 
driver is found to have at least 
50 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of his 
or her blood. [paras. 27-30]
 
The accused was convicted.
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
BY THE BOOK:
s.144(1) B.C.’S Motor Vehicle Act
A person must not drive a motor vehicle on 
a highway
(a) without due care and attention,
(b) without reasonable consideration for 
other persons using the highway, or
(c) at a speed that is excessive relative to 
the road, traffic, visibility or weather conditions.
BY THE NUMBERS: 
FACTS, FIGURES, and FOOTNOTES
Court Delays
The average time to dispose of traffic cases in 
British Columbia has increased from 220 days for 
2005/2006 to 294 days for 2007/2008. For criminal 
cases this went from 189 days to 215. 
Source: Ministry of Attorney General, 2007/08 
Annual Service Report, p. 23.
Road User Fatalities
In 2006 there were 2,892 road user fatalities in 
Canada. This was down from 2,905 in 2005. 
Source: www.tc.gc.ca 
“[I]t is a reasonable inference to draw 
that the Legislature has in effect 
legislated that the minimum standard of 
care of a reasonable driver using the 
highway is breached if the person drives 
while his or her ability to do so is 
affected by alcohol. It is sufficient 
evidence of being so affected if the 
driver is found to have at least 50 mg of 
alcohol in 100 ml of his or her blood.”
www.10-8.ca6
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HOMICIDE BY THE NUMBERS: 
2007
According to a recently released 
Statistics Canada report, 
“Homicide in Canada, 2007”, there 
were 12 fewer homicides last year 
than the year before (2006). This accounts for a 3% 
decrease in the homicide rate. Seven provinces 
reported a decrease in the homicide rate while 
Manitoba, Ontario and New Brunswick saw an 
increase. Manitoba had the largest increase in 
homicide, with 23 more homicides in 2007 than in 
2006. Ontario had the most homicides with 201 while 
Prince Edward Island had none. Twenty percent, 
about one in five homicides, were gang related. 
Methods
The most popular method used to commit homicide was 
stabbing, followed by shooting. Other methods included 
beating, strangulation / suffocation, fire, vehicles, 
poisoning, shaken baby syndrome, and unknown causes. 
Guns
Of the 188 homicides involving firearms, the weapon of 
choice was a handgun. 
Homicides by Province/Territory
Area Homicides Change over 
2006
Rate
Per 100,000
British Columbia 88 -20 2.01
Alberta 88 -7 2.53
Saskatchewan 30 -12 3.01
Manitoba 62 +23 5.22
Ontario 201 +5 1.57
Quebec 90 -3 1.17
Newfoundland 3 -4 0.59
Nova Scotia 13 -3 1.39
New Brunswick 8 +1 1.07
Prince Edward Island 0 -1 0.00
Yukon 2 +2 6.45
North West Territories 2 +2 4.69
Nunavut 7 +5 22.50
Canada 594 -12 1.80
Homicides Involving Firearms
Firearm Type Number of 
Victims
%
Handgun
 
126 67%
Rifle/Shotgun
 
32 17%
Fully Automatic 
Firearm
 
2 1%
Sawed-off 
Rifle/Shotgun
 
17 9%
Firearm-like 
Weapons
1 0.5%
Unknown Type 10 5%
Source: Statistics Canada, 2008, “Homicide in Canada, 2007”, 
catalogue no. 85-002-X, Vol. 28, no.9
www.10-8.ca
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Gang Related Homicides
Gang related homicides, including the killing of gang 
members or innocent bystanders, is increasing. 
In total, 117 of Canada’s 594 homicides were 
reported as gang-related. Ontario recorded the most 
gang-related homicides at 29, followed by British 
Columbia (23), Quebec (22), Alberta (20), Manitoba 
(11) and Saskatchewan (9). Atlantic Canada recorded 
two while there was only one reported in the 
Territories. 
Firearms were used in 69% of gang-related 
homicides, compared to 20% that did not involve 
gangs. 
Other Highlights
• 84% of solved homicides were committed by 
someone known to the victim;
• Manitoba had its highest homicide rate recorded 
since 1961, when data was first available;
• British Columbia reported its second lowest 
homicide rate since 1961;
• Quebec’s homicide rate was its lowest in 40 years;
• Toronto had 111 homicides, nearly 20% of the 
national total;
• Of Canada’s census metropolitan areas (100,000+ 
populations), Saskatoon had the highest homicide 
rate at 3.60 per 100,000 residents, followed by 
Winnipeg (3.55), Edmonton (3.28), Calgary (3.14), 
Trois Rivieres (2.73), Regina (2.46), Greater 
Sudbury (2.46), Vancouver (2.41), and Toronto 
(2.01). Quebec City recorded no homicides. It was 
the first time that a census metropolitan area 
over 500,000 residents did not have a homicide 
since data was first collected in 1981 ;
• 88.5% of persons accused of homicide are males;
• 74 youth were accused of homicide in 2007, down 
from 85 in 2006;
SUPPORT THE BADGE:
RELATIONAL SURVIVAL FOR 
POLICE FAMILIES
“The true weight of the badge is not overcome by muscle, 
not found in the gym, not measured on a scale. This weight 
requires a strength and conditioning for which few officers 
are trained. The badge is not just pinned on a chest, it is 
pinned on a lifestyle.” - Police Officer
2002 20072006200520042003
www.supportthebadge.ca
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REFUSAL TO EXIT VEHICLE 
AMOUNTED TO AN 
OBSTRUCTION
R. v. Dodd, 2008 BCPC 290
 
Shortly after 1:00 am a police officer 
stopped a van being driven without a front 
licence plate and a rear plate hanging in 
the back window. After receiving the 
accused’s driver’s licence, the officer returned to his 
police car and determined the accused was in violation 
of a probation curfew. The officer went back to the 
van and asked the accused to step out in order to 
arrest him for the breach. However, the officer did 
not tell the accused of the breach because he was 
concerned with his safety and wanted to avoid a police 
pursuit. The accused had been exhibiting "weird 
behaviour" and appeared to be very nervous.  He was 
shaking and making sudden motions with his head and 
arms—looking suddenly to the left or the right and 
reaching around the van to his left and his right. He 
was also bending over at the waist.  
The accused told the officer he would not exit the van, 
instead indicating he wanted to call his lawyer first. 
Following a second refusal to exit the van, the officer 
reached to open the van door.  The accused locked the 
door, closed the window, refused to get out of the 
vehicle, and could be seen reaching around inside the 
vehicle.  The accused was again asked to get out, but 
refused and started the engine. The officer used his 
baton to break the van’s window, opened the door, and 
pulled the accused out. As a result, the accused was 
charged with obstructing a peace officer. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the officer 
testified the accused had been detained during the 
traffic stop but had not been told he was under arrest 
until after he was removed from the van. The Crown 
submitted that it was appropriate for the officer to 
request the accused exit the vehicle prior to telling 
him he was under arrest for officer safety reasons 
and to avoid a possible police pursuit. In its view, it is 
common at a traffic stop for police to ask a person 
exit their vehicle and the officer was acting in a 
reasonable and practical manner. The accused 
testified he was not going to open the door of his van 
until he was told why, even though he knew that he was 
on probation and thought that maybe the incident 
related to his curfew.  In his view, he had no legal duty 
to exit his vehicle and was entitled to know why he was 
asked to do so by the police.
Judge Wingham found the officer was acting in the 
execution of his duty and that the accused was aware 
of this. The officer had pulled the accused over to 
investigate a traffic violation he had observed. He 
asked for the accused’s driver's licence and 
subsequently determined that he was breaching 
probation—committing a criminal offence.  The court 
stated:
In this case, I am satisfied that [the officer] was 
acting within the execution of his duty when he 
asked [the accused] to exit his vehicle.  As a police 
officer he had a duty to prevent the continuation of 
an ongoing offence. That offence was the ongoing 
breach by [the accused] of his probation order. In 
my view he was reasonably justified in requesting 
[the accused] to exit the van without telling him 
that he was under arrest or that he was going to be 
arrested.  His evidence, which I accept, was that 
[the accused’s] physical motions in the vehicle 
caused him to be concerned that [the accused] 
might be reaching for an object that he might use 
as a weapon.  He was also concerned that [the 
accused] would drive away and cause a police pursuit.
[The accused] was in his motor vehicle on a public 
highway. He was committing a criminal offence at 
the time. In my opinion [the officer’s] conduct was 
necessary and reasonably justified in the 
circumstances which he was presented with. [paras. 
17-18]
The judge also found the accused was at least 
suspicious that the officer was investigating a breach 
of his curfew:
It was clear, in my view, to [the accused] that [the 
officer] was engaged in the execution of his duty.  
The evidence, in my view, establishes that [the 
accused] knew that [the officer] was acting in the 
execution of his duty when he asked him to exit his 
van. He knew that [the officer] had stopped him and 
he knew why.  He knew that [the officer] had taken 
his driver's licence.  He knew that he was on 
probation and that he had a curfew on his probation 
order. He knew that [the officer] was continuing his 
investigation.  This was evident by his comments 
about suspecting that it had to do with his curfew 
and that he wanted to provide an explanation. He 
may not have been certain as to why [the officer] 
was asking him to get out of the van but he knew 
www.10-8.ca
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that [the officer] was continuing his investigation.  
His intention was clearly in my view to prevent [the 
officer] from continuing that investigation.
[The accused’s] actions in locking his door, putting 
up his window and refusing [the officer’s] request to 
exit the vehicle amount in the circumstances of this 
case to obstruction of [the officer] in the execution 
of his duty as contemplated by s. 129(a) of the 
Criminal Code. [paras. 21-22]
The accused was convicted of obstructing a peace 
officer. 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
REQUIRES HONEST BELIEF BASED 
ON OBJECTIVE MEASUREMENTS
R. v. Bowie, 2008 BCPC 304
 
Shortly before midnight a citizen was 
following a vehicle being driven 
erratically and called 911 to make a 
report, including providing a personalized 
licence plate number. The vehicle was drifting over the 
centre line and crossed over the white line on the right 
side of the roadway. The citizen subsequently turned 
off the highway and lost sight of the vehicle. A police 
officer, experienced in impaired driving investigations, 
received the radio report and proceeded to the 
highway where he observed a vehicle that appeared to 
be swerving within its lane. The officer followed the 
vehicle for about two kilometers, noting the plate 
matched and saw the vehicle cross the marked centre 
line on five occasions and the line on the right side of 
the road. As well, the vehicle rubbed against the curb 
dividing opposing lanes of traffic. The officer 
activated his emergency lights and the vehicle turned 
into a service station off the highway without 
signalling.  
The officer approached the vehicle and the accused 
was the driver and sole occupant.   She produced her 
driver’s licence without difficulty, but the officer 
noted her face was flushed, she had red cheeks, and 
her eyes were blinking more slowly than normal. He also 
noted a strong odour of liquor on the accused’s breath 
and she admitted to drinking two glasses of wine. She 
was asked to step from the vehicle and her balance was 
unsteady and unsure, described as “slightly wobbly. 
The accused’s clothes were not disorganized, her 
pupils were not dilated or watery, and she was polite 
and cooperative. Nonetheless, the officer formed the 
opinion the accused’s ability to operate a motor vehicle 
was impaired by alcohol. She drove erratically, 
admitted to consuming alcohol, and exhibited physical 
indicia of impairment. The officer testified only about 
two minutes elapsed from the time of the pull over to 
the time the officer formed his opinion. The accused 
was given the breathalyzer demand and was 
subsequently charged with impaired driving and over 
80mg%.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused argued the officer was not entitled to make a 
breathalyzer demand on such a quick assessment. 
Rather, he should have considered the observations 
that would lead to  a conclusion the accused’s ability to 
drive was not impaired by alcohol, such as her 
politeness and cooperativeness, non disorderly 
clothing, and that she was able to pull her vehicle over 
in an unremarkable manner. 
Judge Rodgers, however, noted that s.254(3) of the 
Criminal Code only requires that a police officer 
subjectively have an honest belief that the suspect 
driver has committed the offence and, objectively, 
reasonable grounds for this belief exist. In rejecting 
the accused’s contention that the officer did not have 
the requisite belief, Judge Rodgers stated: 
…I find that [the officer] had reasonable and 
probable grounds, objectively measured, to form 
the opinion that [the accused’s] ability to operate a 
motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.  His 
observations of her very erratic driving, the strong 
odour of alcohol on her breath, her admission of the 
consumption of alcohol and her unsteady balance 
were quite sufficient to form the requisite opinion. 
[para. 19]
The officer had reasonable and probable grounds, 
objectively measured, to form his opinion and the 
demand for breath samples was therefore lawful. 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
"The trouble with the laws these days is that criminals 
know their rights better than their wrongs." - Author 
Unknown
www.10-8.ca12
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ODOUR OF BURNED MARIHUANA 
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY 
DOORSTEP ARREST
R. v. Arrance & R. v. Eddy, 2008 BCPC 301
Police attended the accused Arrance’s 
residence to offer him $500 if he would 
provide information on other people 
under investigation. An officer knocked 
on the door and announced himself as a police officer. 
The door was answered by a man named Piche and, 
immediately upon the door being opened, the officer 
smelled an overwhelming odour of burning marihuana.  
Piche was immediately arrested and the house was 
cleared to secure the residence for evidence of 
possession of a controlled substance and for officer 
safety. Arrance was found in a bedroom and the 
accused Eddy was found in a bathroom. No marihuana 
was found on Piche after his arrest and no burning 
marihuana was found in the house. However, a green 
leafy substance believed to be marihuana was found in 
the living room. A search warrant was obtained and 
various items were seized. Both Arrance and Eddy 
were charged with breaching their undertakings for 
having contact with each other and with Piche. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accuseds argued the police breached their s.8 Charter 
rights by entering the residence without a warrant and 
without exigent circumstances. In their view, the 
police cannot enter a residence to effect an arrest 
unless they have obtained a warrant to do so or when 
exigent circumstances exist. The Crown, on the other 
hand, submitted the police approach to the residence 
to offer money for information was a legitimate 
purpose and once Piche opened the door he assumed 
the risk that the odours from the residence would be 
detected and acted upon. In the Crown’s position, the 
accuseds’ s.8 Charter rights were not breached and, 
even if they were, the evidence was admissible under 
s.24(2).
Judge Brecknell found the police lawfully approached 
the house. “I have some concerns about the efficacy 
of police knocking on the doors of suspected criminals 
with the idea that those answering would turn over 
colleagues or even competitors for a few pieces of 
silver,” he said. “But I cannot conclude that the police 
actions were done in bad faith.” However, by opening 
the door Piche was not inviting the officers inside the 
residence. He was only prepared to engage them at the 
door. 
As for the arrest that followed, it was unlawful. Judge 
Brecknell stated:
I am unable to find that [the officer] had the 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. 
Piche. He did not find him committing an actual 
crime. He did not say in his evidence that the smell 
of marihuana coming from the residence was, in his 
many years of experience, related to circumstances 
where more marihuana, unburned, was present.  He 
did not say that he smelled marihuana on Mr. Piche.  
[The officer] did not give the court any information 
about his subjective beliefs so they could be 
objectively tested to conclude as to whether or not 
why he believed there was more marihuana in the 
residence was reasonable in the circumstances.
Immediately upon smelling the marihuana and 
arresting Mr. Piche, he and the other RCMP 
members just barged in without a warrant.  Because 
[the officer] did not give any evidence on whether 
or not he concluded on any grounds that there was 
more marihuana in the residence, I am unable to 
objectively decide whether his actions were 
reasonable in the circumstances. 
…I conclude that [the officer] did not turn his mind 
to whether or not any marihuana that might be 
present exceeded or did not exceed 30 grams.  he 
only evidence he gave was that he smelled 
marihuana, and he acted solely upon the smell.  That 
procedure in these circumstances makes Mr. 
Piche's arrest prima facie unlawful and any 
subsequent search a violation of s. 8 of the Charter. 
[paras. 28-30]
The evidence was excluded under s.24(2) and Crown 
directed a stay of proceedings on the charges. 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
FINGERPRINTING FOLLOWING 
ARREST WAS NOT A ‘SEARCH’
R. v. Ferris, 2008 BCPC 266
 
Police executed a search warrant at a 
warehouse and found a 44 foot shipping 
container with 575 marihuana plants 
inside as well as other items related to 
growing marihuana. While maintaining surveillance at 
the warehouse, the accused was arrested for 
production and possession for the purpose of 
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trafficking after he pulled his vehicle directly in front 
of the warehouse, got out, and began to walk the 
pathway leading to the warehouse. He was advised of 
his Charter rights and taken to the police detachment 
where he was photographed and fingerprinted and 
then released on a Promise to Appear. At the time of 
his arrest it was the police policy to fingerprint an 
accused before charges were laid. The police then used 
the accused’s fingerprints taken following his arrest as 
evidence and he was charged with producing a 
controlled substance and possession for the purpose of 
trafficking in British Columbia Provincial Court.
The accused argued the taking of fingerprints was a 
search that violated the Identification of Criminals 
Act if taken before a charge was laid, and therefore 
amounted to a s.8 Charter breach. In his view, the 
fingerprints that were taken after he was arrested 
but before he was formally charged and the print 
evidence were inadmissible under s.24(2). The Crown 
contended that there was no s.8 violation because the 
police can fingerprint a person who has been lawfully 
arrested but not yet charged.  Further, the Crown 
submitted that fingerprinting as an incident to arrest 
is not a search.  And, even if there was a breach, the 
evidence should be admitted.  
After reviewing numerous cases, Judge Giardini 
concluded that “taking fingerprints pursuant to a 
lawful arrest, albeit before charges are laid, does not 
constitute a search.” Since there was no search, there 
was no violation of s.8. However, if the judge was wrong 
in his conclusion that there was no s.8 breach, the 
evidence was nonetheless admissible under s.24(2). 
The accused’s application to exclude the evidence of 
his fingerprints was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
Editor’s note: Be careful using 
this judgment. In British 
Columbia, at least, there are 
differing court opinions of 
whether fingerprinting is a 
search, and if it is a search, 
whether charges must be sworn 
before such process will be 
reasonable under s.8 of the 
Charter if taken under the 
Identification of Criminals Act.   
DESPITE 13 MINUTE DELAY, 
DEMAND MADE AS SOON AS 
PRACTICABLE 
R. v. Hedican, 2008 BCSC 754 
Two police officers stopped the 
accused’s truck as he began to back up in 
a parking lot. When asked for his driver’s 
licence, the accused did not produce it 
nor his registration.  An officer believed he was 
impaired. She smelled a strong odour of alcohol, noted 
he slurred his words, and had bloodshot eyes and poor 
motor skills.  He was arrested, handcuffed, advised of 
his rights, and was then placed in the police car.
Some friends or acquaintances of the accused 
appeared at the same time the officer was trying to 
search the vehicle for liquor and looking for the 
registration and identification of the driver. They 
were obnoxious, noisy, agitated, drunk or impaired and 
one of them tried to secure the keys of the 
truck.   About ten minutes passed before the officer 
could restore order, search the vehicle and secure the 
pickup truck.   She then returned to her cruiser and 
read a formal breath demand. The accused was yelling, 
cursing, threatening lawsuits and being generally 
obnoxious.  He refused to provide a breath sample and 
was charged with that offence. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the judge 
accepted, among other evidence, that the formal 
demand was made as soon as practicable, despite the 
13-minute delay. The accused was convicted of the 
refusal. He then appealed to the British Columbia 
Supreme Court arguing, among other grounds, that the 
formal demand was not made as soon as practicable 
because of the 13-minute delay.  
Justice Kelleher concluded the trial judge did not err 
in deciding that the police officer acted reasonably 
and made the formal demand as soon as practicable. 
Although some of the tasks undertaken by the 
arresting officer could have been done by her partner, 
s.254(3) of the Criminal Code does not require a 
demand be made as soon as possible. Rather, the 
demand must be made reasonably promptly in all the 
circumstances, as was the case here. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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Assault Police
The number of offences of assaulting police dipped 
in 2007 to 1,115, down slightly from 1,143 in 2006. 
However, the number of offences still remains high 
when compared to 2000 numbers when there were 
only 807 assault police offences reported. 
OBSTRUCTION CHARGES 
CONTINUE 
TO RISE
Although the Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics reported in July that Canada’s overall 
crime rate dropped by 7% in 2007, British 
Columbia’s Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor 
General again reports that police obstruction 
charges are on the rise. The number 
of offences for obstruction 
have risen from an eight 
year low of 1,226 in 
2000 to a  high of 2,022 in 
2007. That is an increase of 
more than 60%. Of the 2,022 
reported offences in 2007, 1,823 were cleared, 
representing a clearance rate of more than 90%. 
There were 900 persons charged with obstruction, 
including 834 adults and 66  youths. 
 60%
20072006200520042003200220012000
Obstruct 
Police
Persons 
Charged 
Obstruct 
Police
Source: Police and Crime, Summary Statistics, 1997-2006, 
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General
Assault Police Offences 
Year Number of Offences
2007 1,115
2006 1,143
2005 1,021
2004 922
2003 934
2002 878
2001 834
2000 807
Source: British Columbia Crime Trends, 1998-2007, 
Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General
Obstruct Poli  ff ces: 2000-2007
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TEST FOR ARREST INVOLVES 
SUBJECTIVE-OBJECTIVE 
ANALYSIS
R. v. McDougall & Coulson, 2008 BCSC 1493
A police officer, a 16 year veteran with 
considerable experience involving 500 
drug investigations, received a telephone 
call from a reliable informant, who was 
involved in cocaine trafficking, stating that the accused 
McDougall, referred to as “Clarence”, and another 
person were trafficking cocaine. He provided their 
location and described the vehicle as a  green Jeep, 
that McDougall was wearing a black hat and black 
jacket, and that they were carrying on a “dial-a-dope” 
operation. The informant, however, did not refer to the 
accused Coulson by name or describe what he was 
wearing.
Two officers drove an 
unmarked police car to 
the location described 
and saw a green Jeep in 
the middle of a 
Pharmasave parking lot.  
It was the only vehicle 
there and the 
Pharmasave and other stores in the area were closed. 
The informant confirmed that the green Jeep in the 
parking lot was the suspect vehicle and an officer then 
formed a belief that the occupants of the vehicle were 
trafficking cocaine.  The general location in which the 
Jeep was spotted was a known area for trafficking 
cocaine and the front seat passenger,  wearing a black 
jacket and ball cap, was talking on a cellular telephone, 
a common tool in dial-a-dope operations. Police arrested 
the men and provided them with their Charter rights. 
Five to 10 minutes after the arrest the Jeep was 
searched. Police found a Sprite pop can in the middle of 
the front passenger floor. The can had a false 
compartment and contained 13 spit balls of cocaine.  
Other evidence was found in the Jeep including a cell 
phone, cash, and packaging for a spit ball matching 
packaging found in the Sprite can.  On the accused 
Coulson police found $320 pocket cash in various 
denominations. Both accused were charged with 
unlawfully possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Supreme Court 
the accused Coulson challenged the admissibility of the 
cocaine, among other evidence, seized from the vehicle. 
In his view he was arbitrarily detained under s.9 of the 
Charter and the searches that followed were 
unreasonable under s.8. He submitted the evidence 
should be excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter.  
Under s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code a peace officer 
may arrest without warrant a person who has 
committed an indictable offence or who, on reasonable 
grounds, the officer believes has committed or is about 
to commit an indictable offence. In deciding whether 
an arrest is lawful, a court will examine two 
components; (1) whether the peace officer subjectively 
believed that they had grounds to make the arrest; and 
(2) whether objectively there were reasonable grounds  
to arrest based on the totality of the circumstances.
In this case, Justice Scarth found the officer 
had the requisite subjective belief that he 
had grounds to arrest the occupants of the 
Jeep.  He had received reliable information 
matching the contemporaneous, unfolding 
events in the parking lot. As well, the grounds 
were reasonable from an objective point of 
view. Justice Scarth held:
The second question is whether a reasonably 
objective person standing in the shoes of [the 
officer] would believe there were reasonable 
grounds to arrest the occupants of the Jeep, given 
the totality of the circumstances.  In my judgment, 
that test is also met, given that [the officer] had 
received from the informant the location of the 
drug dealers, particulars of their vehicle, and the 
name and wearing apparel of one of the drug 
dealers.   The tip received from the informant was 
relatively contemporaneous with the spotting of the 
drug dealers’ vehicle.
[The officer] testified as to the reliability of the 
informant on past occasions. Dial-a-dopers are not 
easy subjects of surveillance given the mobility of 
their vehicles in which they do their transactions 
and their use of a cell telephone. [paras. 21-22]
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer 
subjectively and objectively had reasonable grounds to 
search the accused and the vehicle, and seize the 
drugs. The accused’s application for exclusion was 
dismissed and the evidence was admissible.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“The second question is whether a 
reasonably objective person 
standing in the shoes of [the officer] 
would believe there were 
reasonable grounds to arrest ... 
given the totality of the 
circumstances.” 
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2007 SUPREME COURT RULINGS OF INTEREST TO POLICE
Ruling Vote Majority Author
Culpability
R. v. Jackson, 2007 SCC 52: Upheld conviction of accused arrested with four others at a 
secluded and remote marijuana plantation. Although the mere presence of an accused at the 
scene of a crime does not prove culpable participation in its commission, Jackson’s conviction did 
not rest merely on his  presence at the scene but also included his apprehension at the scene, the 
rejection of his explanation for being there, the particular nature of the offence, the context in 
which it was committed, and other circumstantial evidence of his guilt. 
5-2 Fish
Right to Silence (s.7 Charter)
R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48: Ruled police did not beach the accused’s right to silence when 
they  persistently tried to obtain a statement from him after he was arrested for murder and was 
advised of his s.10(b) rights and privately consulted with counsel. The accused’s incriminating 
admission came freely and did not result from the police systematically breaking down his 
operating mind or undermining his right to silence.  
5-4 Charron
Informer Privilege
Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, 2007 SCC 43: Upheld the law long recognizing that 
confidential police informers must be protected from the possibility of retribution by withholding 
their identity, including information which might tend to identify them, Outside the innocence at 
stake exception, the rule’s protection is absolute and no case-by-case weighing of the justification 
for the privilege is permitted. A court has no discretion in the matter.
8-1 Bastarache
Negligent Investigation
Hill v. Hamilton Wentworth Regional Police Service, 2007 SCC 41: Found the police 
were not negligent in arrest of suspect who spent 20 months in jail for a crime he did not commit. 
However, court did hold that police are not immune from liability under the law of negligence 
and the tort of negligent investigation exists in Canada. Police owe a duty of care to suspects in 
the conduct of their investigations which should be measured against the standard of how a 
reasonable officer in like circumstances would have acted.  
6-3 McLachlin
Reasonable and Probable Grounds-Breath Demand
R. v. Rhyason, 2007 SCC 39: Rejected an appeal by an accused who argued the police did 
not have reasonable and probable grounds to read him a breath demand after he struck and 
killed a pedestrian. Trial judge was relying on more than just evidence of alcohol consumption 
and properly considered the testimony of the officer about the circumstances of the unexplained 
accident as well as signs of the accused’s impairment. He also reviewed the relevant jurisprudence 
emanating from similar fact situations and appropriately took into consideration the presence of 
an unexplained accident.  
5-4 Abella
Use Firearm - s.85(1) Criminal Code
R. v. Steele, 2007 SCC 36: Affirmed the conviction of an accused for using a firearm during the 
commission of an offence (a home invasion). An offender uses a firearm within the meaning of 
s.85(1) of the Criminal Code where the offender reveals by words or conduct the actual presence 
or immediate availability of a firearm to facilitate the commission of an offence or for purposes of 
escape. The weapon must be in the physical possession of the offender or readily at hand.  In this 
case the accused and his accomplices repeatedly referred to a firearm in their physical possession 
or one readily at hand in order to facilitate a break and enter. They were apprehended within 
minutes after the 911 calls were made and police found a loaded handgun in their getaway car.
9-0 Fish
www.10-8.ca
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Ruling Vote Majority Author
Obstructing justice-Police officer
R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC 5: Upheld the conviction of a police officer for obstructing justice 
for deliberately failing to gather evidence (breath samples) needed to lay criminal charges 
against another police officer. Although a police officer who has reasonable grounds to believe 
that an offence has been committed or that a more thorough investigation might produce 
evidence that could form the basis of a criminal charge may exercise discretion to decide not 
to engage the judicial process, this discretion is not absolute. Discretion must be justified 
subjectively (exercised honestly and transparently) and objectively (on valid grounds). However, 
exercising discretion improperly is not enough to ground a conviction. Rather, the accused needs 
to act in a manner intended to defeat or obstruct the course of justice and with intent.  A simple 
error of judgment will not be enough for a conviction. 
4-1-4 Charron
Confessions Rule 
R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC 11: Restored the convictions of a man after the appeal court threw 
out statements he made to police. In determining whether a statement is voluntary several 
factors are relevant including whether the police made any promises or threatened the accused. 
A promise renders a statement involuntary only if the quid pro quo provides a strong enough 
inducement to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the will of the suspect was overborne.  
In this case, no offer was made to treat the accused’s girlfriend leniently and withholding a visit 
with her until a partial confession was made was not a strong enough inducement to render the 
accused’s statement inadmissible.  
5-2 Deschamps
Application of Charter on Foreign Soil
R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26: Dismissed an appeal by a Canadian businessman, suspected of 
money laundering in the Turks and Caicos Islands, that the Charter applied to the actions of 
Canadian police in searching his office outside of Canada and therefore the documentary 
evidence seized should have been excluded. The Charter does not generally apply to searches 
and seizures in other countries, subject to the Charter’s fair trial safeguards.  In this case, the police 
officers were government actors, but the searches carried out in Turks and Caicos were not a 
matter within the authority of Parliament.  And further, the admission of the evidence would not 
violate the accused’s right to a fair trial. 
5-3-1 Lebel
Investigative Detention
R. v. Clayton, 2007 SCC 32: Restored the conviction of two accused stopped by police 
leaving the parking lot where a report that about ten “black guys” were in front of a strip club 
displaying handguns. The initial detention was reasonably necessary to respond to the 
seriousness of the offence and the threat to safety inherent in the presence of prohibited 
weapons in a public place. The detention was temporally, geographically and logistically 
responsive to the circumstances known to the police. The continued detention was also justified 
because both accused came from the scene of the reported crime in the first vehicle to leave 
the lot within minutes of the 911 call and matched the 911 caller’s description. The search, 
based on legitimate safety concerns, was justified as incidental to their lawful investigative 
detentions.  
5-3 Abella
In the next issue, 2008 cases of interest to police will be reviewed.
www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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TIP FROM RELIABLE INFORMER 
PLUS CONFIRMATION PROVIDES 
REASONABLE GROUNDS
R. v. McCabe, 2008 NLCA 62
A police officer received a two to four 
minute telephone call at about 8:05 pm 
from an informant stating the accused 
would be driving a green Cavalier, license 
number AWD 761, containing a quantity of marihuana 
west from St. John’s, Newfoundland on the Trans 
Canada Highway within the hour. The accused knew the 
marihuana was in the vehicle but it belonged to the 
vehicle’s passenger, Wayne Baldwin, who intended to 
sell it. The officer believed the informant. He had 
supplied information in the past and was a 
“recreational” drug user with a criminal record, but 
nothing for deceit such as fraud or perjury. He  
sounded as though he was giving “first-hand” 
information and seemed nervous, concerned that 
providing the information might result in his 
identification. The tip was also related to information 
the officer had about the drug trade in the area.  He 
had heard in previous years from other sources, 
unconfirmed as to reliability, that Baldwin was involved 
in drug trafficking.
The officer drove to the Trans Canada Highway with 
another officer to intercept the vehicle. At about 9:25 
p.m. police stopped the car and arrested both 
occupants after the accused identified himself. There 
was nothing visible in the vehicle and a pat-down search 
failed to find drugs on either occupant. The vehicle was 
moved about two hundred yards to an abandoned 
parking lot and a police dog was used to search the car.  
The dog indicated there were drugs in the sleeve of a 
coat on the rear seat of the vehicle.  The drugs were 
seized and the men were 
released on appearance 
notices.   
At trial in Newfoundland 
Provincial Court the officer 
testified he considered 
obtaining a warrant before 
stopping the vehicle but did 
not believe it was 
practicable because the 
informant said the activity 
was to occur within an hour. He believed he had to 
locate the vehicle or lose the evidence. The trial judge 
concluded the officer did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds to search the vehicle. There was no 
objective information from another source confirming 
the allegation of unlawful activity, no information 
confirming the source of the informant’s knowledge, 
the tip lacked detail, and there was very little 
objective evidence about the source’s reliability. 
However, he did find the informant’s information 
provided the officers with “articulabe cause” 
justifying the stop as an investigative detention. The 
initial stop and detention was therefore not arbitrary 
but the continued detention was not justified. There 
was nothing in plain view at the time the vehicle was 
stopped and nothing had been discovered on the 
occupants to justify further detention. The accused’s 
s.8 Charter rights were breached and the marihuana 
was excluded under s.24(2).
The Crown appealed to the Newfoundland Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in finding a s.8 
breach. Justice Barry, authoring the unanimous 
judgment of the Appeal Court, agreed. Although the 
trial judge was correct in holding that the search of 
the vehicle was not justified as incidental to 
investigative detention since they discovered nothing 
in plain view or on the pat-down searches, it was lawful 
as an incident to arrest. He stated:
To be authorized under the common law doctrine of 
search incidental to arrest, the search must be 
truly incidental in that the police must be able to 
explain, within the purposes recognized in the 
jurisprudence (protecting the police, protecting the 
evidence, or discovering evidence) or by reference 
to some other valid purpose, why they conducted 
the search.  [reference omitted, para. 21] 
In finding the police had made a lawful arrest, one 
based on reasonable grounds, 
Justice Barry wrote:
 
In the present case, whether 
the police had reasonable 
grounds for arresting [the 
accused] depends upon whether 
the tip received was 
sufficiently reliable. This Court 
must carefully scrutinize the 
facts surrounding the arrest to 
ensure that the police did not 
“To be authorized under the common law 
doctrine of search incidental to arrest, the 
search must be truly incidental in that the 
police must be able to explain, within the 
purposes recognized in the jurisprudence 
(protecting the police, protecting the 
evidence, or discovering evidence) or by 
reference to some other valid purpose, why 
they conducted the search.”
www.10-8.ca
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exceed or abuse their powers. Here the totality of 
the circumstances, including the fact that [the 
officer] had previously received information from 
the informant, which was confirmed as reliable when 
it led to a drug seizure, combined with [the 
officer’s] knowledge of drug trade in the area and 
the information (although of unconfirmed 
reliability) about Baldwin’s involvement in drug 
trafficking, is sufficient … for establishing 
adequate reliability of a tip.  The degree of detail of 
the tip, relating to non-criminal aspects of the 
activity, would not in itself have been sufficient 
corroboration here.  [The officer’s] belief that the 
informer’s source of knowledge was firsthand is 
worthy of some consideration, because of the 
officer’s experience.  But it is the indicia of the 
informer’s reliability from past performance, 
combined with some slight confirmation from [the 
officer’s] other investigative sources, that provides 
the main basis for finding that, both subjectively 
and objectively, reasonable grounds for arrest 
existed.  If the informer here had been anonymous 
the result may well have been different. … [para. 26]
Since securing or preserving evidence relating to the 
offence for which an accused is arrested are valid 
purposes to justify a search incidental to an arrest, the 
search here was valid. The police had reasonable 
grounds to search for the purpose of securing and 
preserving the marijuana about which they had 
received the tip.  
The trial judge erred by failing to consider whether 
the search was valid as an incident to arrest, the 
Crown’s appeal was allowed, and the evidence was 
admissible. The case was sent back for trial. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ARRESTEE MUST EXERCISE RIGHT 
TO SPEAK TO LAWYER OF CHOICE 
DILIGENTLY
R. v. Sorenson, 2008 BCSC 354
After pulling the accused over at about 10 
p.m., a police officer formed reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe he was 
impaired. He was given the conventional 
police warning and told he had the right to contact legal 
counsel.  At the police station the accused told the 
officer that he wanted to talk to a lawyer and provided 
his lawyer’s office number. Given the time of night, the 
officer asked the accused whether he would like to call 
legal aid if his lawyer did not answer. The accused said 
“Sure.” The guard then made the call because police 
restricted an arrestee’s access to the telephone, which 
had no dial-out capability. There was no answer when 
the guard called and a message was left for the lawyer 
to call back. After waiting five or ten minutes without 
a response from the accused’s lawyer, the guard called 
legal aid and the accused spoke to a lawyer. The 
accused then provided two breath samples of 220 mg% 
and was charged with operating a motor vehicle over 
80mg%. 
   
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the accused 
argued that his right to contact counsel of his choice 
had been breached. He argued that by assuming 
complete control over his means of contacting counsel, 
the police were required to do things that a reasonable 
person in his position would have done to get through 
to his lawyer of choice, such as locating and calling his 
lawyer’s home number.  In other words, police denied 
the accused an opportunity to contact his lawyer 
himself and did not themselves take reasonable steps 
to contact that lawyer. Because the police did not do 
what the accused would have done, they breached his 
s. 10(b) Charter right.  A result, he submitted that the 
analysis of his breath samples gathered by the police 
after the breach should be excluded as evidence. 
 
The trial judge ruled that “once [the accused] was 
unable to speak with his counsel of choice at the 
number that he had provided, he then agreed to speak 
with his counsel of second choice, which was the duty 
counsel lawyer.” He did not give any indication that he 
would prefer to try speaking with his lawyer at his 
home, which would have definitely triggered a 
responsibility on the police to either give him a phone 
book or otherwise assist him in getting that phone 
number.  Rather, the accused was satisfied with his call 
to duty counsel and his right to counsel had been met. 
The trial judge found there was no s.10(b) breach and 
the application to exclude the breathalyzer readings 
was dismissed. The accused was convicted of over 
80mg%. 
The accused then appealed his conviction to the British 
Columbia Supreme Court. He suggested that he was not 
responsible for asking police to make further efforts 
to contact his lawyer of choice.  In his view, there was 
a police duty to do more than physically dialling the 
number he had given to them.   Justice Roger framed 
the accused’s argument this way:
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He argued that in addition to acting as his hands to 
dial the phone, the RCMP should have acted has his 
brain too.  His position amounts to an argument that 
the RCMP should have assumed his cognitive 
function.  This would make the RCMP responsible to 
think up alternate methods of contacting counsel 
and then implement them. The [accused’s] position 
is that, having asked to talk to a particular lawyer, 
it was fine for him to sit back and do nothing more 
– he had off-loaded the onus of thinking up how to 
give effect to his request to the RCMP and he need 
not have done anything further. [para. 11]
Justice Rogers, however, rejected the accused’s 
argument. There was no doubt he was entitled to an 
opportunity to retain and instruct counsel, but he had 
an obligation to exercise his opportunity diligently. 
Here, the accused gave the police his lawyer’s office 
telephone number. In response to an officer’s question, 
he said he would like to talk to legal aid in the event his 
lawyer did not respond.  He had the capacity to direct 
the police to make further efforts to contact his 
lawyer and could not blame the police for his lack of 
determination to speak to his lawyer of choice. In final 
remarks, Justice Rogers stated:
…I make two observations.  First, the fact pattern 
of this case, viz, [the accused] giving the police his 
lawyer’s number and agreeing to talk to an alternate 
advisor if his first choice was unavailable, would, if 
[the accused’s] argument were accepted, amount to 
a trap for the police.  That trap would lie in the 
accused’s apparent acquiescence to one scenario and 
the police following that scenario, and then later 
repudiating that scenario and crying foul.  The court 
cannot in good conscience endorse such a thing.
My second comment is more of an open question: 
Given that s. 10(b) of the Charter enshrines a 
person’s right to “retain and instruct” counsel, can 
it be said that a police officer’s failure to ferret 
out and employ all conventional means of contacting 
an accused’s lawyer of choice can amount to a denial 
of that right in the absence of evidence that those 
means of contact, had they been employed, would 
have been productive?   In other words, can it be 
said that an accused’s right to retain and instruct 
counsel is infringed without there being evidence 
that the lawyer was, in fact, reachable by any given 
reasonably employed, but unused, modality? [para. 
19-20]
The accused’s conviction was upheld and his appeal was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
REASONABLE SUSPICION NEED 
ONLY BE PROVEN ON BALANCE OF 
PROBABILITIES
R. v. Church, 2008 BCSC 686
An officer was conducting a bar check at 
about 11 p.m. when he walked past the 
accused on a boardwalk attached to the 
building. The boardwalk was constructed 
of two-by-fours with spaces in between and the 
accused was wearing high-heeled shoes. She staggered 
and bumped the officer, which raised his suspicions. He 
followed her vehicle as it left the parking lot and 
stopped her. She immediately exited her vehicle 
without any apparent difficulty and turned to her 
vehicle to retrieve documents.  In doing so, she 
stumbled and had to stabilize herself using the seat of 
the vehicle. The officer detected a slight slur in the 
accused’s speech and a moderate odour of liquor on her 
breath.  He formed a suspicion the accused had 
consumed alcohol and gave an ASD demand. She 
subsequently provided breath samples in excess of the 
legal limit and was charged with over 80mg%.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the officer 
testified he did not necessarily attribute the accused’s 
staggering on the boardwalk or her stumbling after the 
stop to the consumption of alcohol, given her footwear 
and the surface she was walking on. The boardwalk was 
made of two-by-fours and the roadway was gravel or 
dirt and was uneven in the area in which she was 
standing.  The trial judge found the Crown failed to 
prove that the officer had the necessary subjective 
belief to make the ASD demand. Although the officer 
believed he had a suspicion of alcohol consumption, he 
never put his mind to whether that alcohol was still in 
the body of the accused. Thus, the trial judge was not 
satisfied the officer had the subjective belief for the 
ASD demand.  The resulting fail test on the ASD was 
inadmissible and therefore the officer did not have 
reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath 
demand. As a result, the breathalyzer tests were 
obtained in breach of s. 8 of the Charter and the 
evidence was excluded under s. 24(2). The accused was 
acquitted. 
The Crown then appealed the acquittal to the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia arguing the trial judge erred 
on his voir dire ruling that the officer did not have the 
necessary subjective belief to make the ASD demand. 
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Justice Curtis noted that the Crown only needed to 
prove on a balance of probabilities that the officer 
reasonably suspected, subjectively and objectively, 
that the accused had alcohol in her body while she was 
driving.  In concluding that the officer did direct his 
mind to whether the accused had alcohol in her body 
while she was driving and that he had a reasonable 
suspicion, both subjectively and objectively, Justice 
Curtis stated:
There is no evidence to support an inference that 
[the accused] consumed alcohol after she stopped 
driving her vehicle, so if there is evidence that she 
had alcohol in her body, it would be evidence she 
had it in her body while she was driving. The trial 
judge did not find that the evidence presented did 
not support a reasonable suspicion on an objective 
basis, rather he found that considering the 
constable’s answer, “I formed the suspicion that 
she had consumed alcoholic beverage …”, "it is 
consistent with all the evidence that the officer 
wrongly believed that all the Code required is a 
suspicion of alcohol consumption without ever 
putting his mind to whether that alcohol was still in 
the body of the accused.”
Such a conclusion is contrary to the course and 
purpose of [the officer’s] investigation.   His 
attention was drawn to [the accused] as she came 
out of the bar of the Springwater Lodge because 
she staggered.  When he pulled her over, he 
observed she had a “slight slurring to her speech” 
and “a moderate odour of alcohol … I could smell the 
odour of liquor coming from her breath … the odour 
of the alcohol or liquor on her breath.”   [The 
officer] gave these observations in answer to the 
question: “And did you notice any indications of her 
level of sobriety at the time?”  Clearly, he was 
speaking of what appeared to be the effects of 
alcohol which would have to be in her body at the 
time to produce such effects.  He obviously 
suspected from what he had seen that she was 
under the influence of alcohol.  He requested a 
sample for the screening device in order to test for 
the presence of alcohol in her body because he 
suspected there was alcohol in her body.  His 
answer, “I formed the suspicion that she had 
consumed alcoholic beverage based on the odour 
coming from her breath” is a part of his evidence, 
but must be considered in relation to the whole of 
it. [paras. 7-8]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
CDSA SEARCH WARRANT DOES 
NOT REQUIRE PRE-AUTHORIZED 
NO KNOCK ENTRY
R. v. Andrews et al., 2008 BCSC 888
A Judicial Justice of the Peace (JJP) 
issued a telewarrant under s.487.1 of the 
Criminal Code for a s. 11 Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act (CDSA) search. 
After obtaining the warrant, eight police officers met 
for a pre-execution briefing and each officer was 
assigned a role in the execution of the 
warrant.  Officers were aware that a surveillance 
camera monitored the front entry to the home and a 
motion sensor worked a bright light in the same area. 
There was a concern that the occupants of the home 
would destroy evidence, as cocaine and heroin can be 
easily flushed down the toilet in many circumstances 
even if minimal notice of police presence is 
given.  Because of this concern it was decided that 
police would execute the warrant by "hard entry."  
When police arrived at the premises they immediately 
rushed the front door with a battering ram. As the ram 
struck the door, officers shouted, "Police.  Search 
warrant. The occupants were not given the chance to 
answer the door. Police entered the premises and a 
number of individuals were arrested, including the 
accused and two men who were caught fleeing through 
the backyard.  A quantity of cocaine and heroin was 
seized, as was a shotgun found under the bed in the 
room where the accused Andrews was arrested. She 
was charged with possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking, possessing heroin for the purpose of 
trafficking, and two firearms offences.
During a voir dire in British Columbia Supreme Court, 
the accused argued the search warrant was invalid 
because the police failed to apply for authorization to 
omit announcement before entry, which rendered the 
warrant fatally tainted, and that it was executed in a 
manner that breached s.8 of the Charter because the 
officers did not comply with the common law knock/
notice rule. The police, on the other hand, testified 
they had a specific concern with the destruction of 
evidence if they complied with the knock/notice rule. 
They believed the premise was a “crack shack” 
equipped with the front door surveillance camera and 
the motion sensor lighting. 
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Although s.529.4 of the 
Criminal Code requires prior 
authorization to omit 
announcement before entry 
while executing entry 
authorizations or warrants to 
arrest under ss.529 and 
529.1 of the Code (a.k.a. 
Feeney warrants), it has no 
application to a search 
warrant issued under s.11 of 
the CDSA.  As Justice 
Bauman noted, “there is no authority for the JJP to 
pre-authorize entry without announcement in the 
execution of such a search warrant.” Thus, the search 
warrant was lawfully issued. 
As for the manner in which the warrant was executed, 
Justice Bauman found the police failure in complying 
with the knock/notice rule was reasonable because 
they had exigent circumstances. In this case, “the 
officers here were not operating on a general policy 
never to knock and provide notice in the execution of 
drug search warrants,” said Justice Bauman.  “They 
rather considered the circumstances specific to these 
premises, and in that consideration of the 
circumstances … they concluded that there was a real 
risk of evidence being destroyed”:  
This was not a marihuana grow operation….  With 
such operations it is often thought unlikely the 
residents will be able to destroy much of the 
paraphernalia and product if the police knock and 
give notice.  It is otherwise with a crack house 
operation like the alleged one at bar, where 
evidence can be easily destroyed, and the residents 
have taken precautions, as here, to secure their 
entry with a surveillance camera and motion 
sensitive lighting. [para. 20]
The warrant was validly issued and executed in a 
reasonable manner. There was no breach of s.8 and the 
fruits of the search were admissible as evidence.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
FIRE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE 
PEACE NOT BIASED
R. v. Stabner, 2008 SKCA 145
Police obtained and executed a search 
warrant under s.11 of the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act issued by the local 
Justice of the Peace who was also the fire 
“[T]he officers here were not operating 
on a general policy never to knock and 
provide notice in the execution of drug 
search warrants. They rather 
considered the circumstances specific 
to these premises, and in that 
consideration of the circumstances … 
they concluded that there was a real 
risk of evidence being destroyed.”
chief and town bylaw enforcement 
officer. The warrant was based on 
information provided by a single 
informant and police found 3.9 pounds 
of marijuana in the accused’s home and 
a large quantity of currency on his 
person. He was found guilty in 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court for 
possessing marihuana for the purpose 
of trafficking and possession of crime 
proceeds. 
The accused appealed his convictions to the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal arguing, among other 
grounds, that the search warrant was invalid and the 
Justice of the Peace who issued it was not acting 
impartially. 
 
In upholding the warrant, Justice Lane, delivering the 
opinion of the appeal court, noted that the judge 
reviewing the validity of the search warrant, in this 
case the trial judge, “is only required to inquire into 
whether there was any basis upon which the Justice of 
the Peace could be satisfied the relevant statutory 
preconditions existed.   The reviewing judge is not to 
substitute his or her view for the authorizing judge; 
instead if the reviewing judge concludes the 
authorizing Justice of the Peace could have granted 
the authorization then he or she should not interfere.” 
In finding the information provided by the informant 
was reliable when considering "the totality of the 
circumstances" and the Information to Obtain could 
reasonably support the issuance of the search warrant 
Justice Lane stated:
In the case before us we have extensive detail 
including repeated incidents over a long period of 
time; a previous incident wherein a police officer did 
surveillance on the accused and a known drug dealer, 
witnessed a transaction and after a search of the 
drug dealer' s vehicle found marijuana and in his 
videotaped warned statement the dealer told the 
police officer he had bought the marijuana from the 
now [accused]; and finally the criminal record of the 
[accused]. In our view there was sufficient evidence 
of reliability. [para. 10]
As for the independence of the Justice of the Peace 
the Court found there was no apprehension of bias:
The issuing Justice of the Peace herein was not in 
daily contact with the police and/or subject to its 
supervision; did not use police resources; and the 
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contact between him and the police force generally 
was when he and the police would show up at the 
same fire scene when he was there in his capacity 
as local fire chief.  [para. 13]
The informing officer also testified there was no 
collaboration or cooperation between the local bylaw 
enforcement officers and the police, stating “they 
enforce what they enforce and we enforce what we 
enforce.” In the Court’s view, “a reasonable person 
would not believe there is a real danger of bias, or even 
a reasonable suspicion of bias even though not 
intended, in the circumstances of this case.”
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca
ERROR TO DISSECT & CONSIDER 
INDICIA OF IMPAIRMENT IN 
ISOLATION 
R. v. Restau, 2008 SKCA 147
A police officer followed the accused 
home after seeing him driving an ATV 
without a helmet. He pulled the ATV into 
his garage. The officer parked his patrol 
car and walked up to the garage to issue a ticket for 
failing to wear a helmet. As they both walked back to 
the police car to have the ticket written up, the officer 
noticed the accused was walking unsteadily and his 
speech was slurred. When in the police car the officer 
noted the smell of alcohol on the accused’s breath. The 
officer then made a roadside screening demand. The 
accused was delayed in his response and then answered 
with slurred speech. The officer set aside the demand 
for the roadside screening test and made a demand for 
a breathalyzer sample. The accused was given his right 
to counsel at the scene but declined to exercise it 
because he indicated he did not know whom to call.
 
He was transported to the police detachment and again 
read his rights to counsel.  He was placed in a holding 
cell containing a phonebook and advised he could call 
anyone he wanted or Legal Aid.  He ultimately decided 
he wanted to call Legal Aid and the officer dialled the 
appropriate number and explained the charges to the 
person who answered.  He then turned over the 
telephone to the accused, left the room, and closed the 
door. After the telephone call ended, the officer re-
entered the holding room and escorted the accused to 
the breathalyzer room. He was subsequently charged 
with impaired driving and over 80mg%.
At trial in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench 
the accused argued his Charter rights under s.8 and 
10(b) were breached and the certificate of analysis 
should be excluded. The trial judge disagreed, 
admitted the certificate, and convicted him of 
operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 
80mg%. He was sentenced to eight months jail, three-
years probation, and given a driving prohibition.
The accused then appealed to the Saskatchewan Court 
of Appeal submitting the trial judge erred in concluding 
the arresting officer had reasonable and probable 
grounds to make the breath demand under s.254(3) of 
the Criminal Code. As well, he challenged the ruling that 
his right to counsel was not violated.
Reasonable Grounds?
The accused argued the officer made a roadside 
screening demand after seeing his unsteady walk and 
slurred speech, but changed his mind when the accused 
delayed his reply to the request and then responded 
with three slurred words (“Pardon me, yup”). At this 
point the officer then made a breathalyzer demand 
without performing the roadside screening test. Since 
the officer testified he did not have reasonable and 
probable grounds to make a breathalyzer demand until 
the slurred response, the accused contended this was 
not a sufficient indicia of impairment to provide the 
necessary reasonable and probable grounds. In other 
words, the trial judge placed undue weight on the 
slurred response.
The Crown, on the other hand, suggested the test for 
reasonable and probable grounds was not onerous, but 
one of reasonable probability—not proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt nor proof of a prima facie case. In its 
view, indicia of impairment cannot be dissected and 
considered in a piecemeal fashion. 
Justice Lane, delivering the decision of the Court, first 
noted the test for establishing reasonable grounds. 
“Reasonable and probable cause contains both a 
subjective and objective element,” he said.  “There 
must be both an actual belief and that belief must be 
reasonable – this is a question of law. The prosecution 
need not establish there is a prima facie case for 
conviction.” In this case there was no dispute the police 
officer believed he had reasonable and probable 
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grounds to make the demand—the 
subjective aspect.   Rather, it was 
the objective element that was in 
question—whether the evidence 
known or available to the police 
officer when he formed his belief 
supported a finding of reasonable 
and probable grounds to make a 
breath demand. In concluding the 
officer did have reasonable and 
probable grounds for the demand, 
Justice Lane stated:
 
The [accused] puts much stock on the officer's 
testimony that until the slurred speech response 
the officer did not have reasonable and probable 
grounds to make a breath demand. Therefore it is 
only the indicia of slurred speech that led to the 
demand and is not sufficient to establish the 
objective element.
 
In our view the [accused] looks at the one indicia in 
isolation and fails to look at all of the 
circumstances or in other words, the totality of 
circumstances.  All of the circumstances must be 
considered and as the [Crown] correctly points out 
it is an error to dissect and consider the indicia of 
impairment in isolation. 
 
The trial judge found the officer witnessed the 
[accused] being unsteady on his feet and slurring 
his words while walking from the garage to the 
patrol car.  After the officer entered the car he 
noticed a strong smell of alcohol on the [accused’s] 
breath.  At that point the officer was clearly 
suspicious the [accused’s] ability to drive was 
impaired therefore he decided to make a roadside 
demand.  Immediately after making that demand 
the officer heard the [accused’s] slurred words and 
hesitant response. The trial judge found this to be 
a new observation as the words were uttered in a 
small enclosed environment and the officer 
testified each separate word was slurred.
 
In our view the trial judge did not place undue 
weight on the indicia of the slurred speech. …  In 
other words it was one factor out of several, which 
led the trial judge to conclude reasonable and 
probable grounds existed.
 
The issue is whether a reasonable person would 
reasonably believe that the [accused’s] ability to 
operate a motor vehicle was impaired on the proven 
facts of a combination of the smell of alcohol, the 
unsteady walking, and the slurred speech of the 
[accused].   Numerous cases 
were cited by each of the 
parties exhibiting various 
factual situations where indicia 
were found to be sufficient or 
not sufficient to establish the 
objective element but each 
case must turn on its own 
facts.  In our view it was open 
to the trial judge to find on the 
evidence that a reasonable 
observer could have concluded 
the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe the [accused] was driving the ATV while 
impaired by alcohol. [paras. 13-17]
 
Right to Counsel 
 
The accused argued, in part, that the action of the 
officer in physically dialling the number for him, 
violated the implementational component of the right 
to counsel because he was not given an opportunity to 
properly retain and instruct counsel of his choice. 
However, Justice Lane also disagreed with this 
contention. This was not a case where Legal Aid was the 
only option given to the accused. Here, police made no 
selection of counsel, nor was any particular counsel 
suggested. The officer left it up to the accused to 
choose his own lawyer. The accused’s right to select 
counsel of his choice was not interfered with.  
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.lawsociety.sk.ca
 ODOUR EMANATING FROM 
VEHICLE PROVIDES REASONABLE 
SUSPICION
R. v. Webster, 2008 BCCA 458
A police officer on patrol noticed a red 
Ford Mustang containing two persons 
stopped near a pub.  He saw someone 
approach the passenger-side window of 
the Mustang and have a brief interaction with those 
inside.  The Mustang then pulled away as the officer 
drove up behind it and a distinctive odour of freshly-
smoked (or burnt) marihuana was detected, believed to 
be coming from inside the Mustang.  The officer 
followed the Mustang for about 200 meters, continuing 
to smell the odour of freshly-smoked marihuana, and 
decided to stop it to determine whether the occupants 
“Reasonable and probable cause 
contains both a subjective and 
objective element. There must be 
both an actual belief and that belief 
must be reasonable – this is a 
question of law. The prosecution 
need not establish there is a prima 
facie case for conviction.”
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had been smoking marihuana or 
had any in their possession.  The 
officer activated his emergency 
equipment and the Mustang 
promptly pulled over.  
The officer approached the open 
driver’s window of the Mustang 
and could smell the odour of 
freshly-smoked marihuana coming 
from inside the vehicle.  He 
continued to detect this odour as 
he was speaking with the accused, 
who was the driver, and asked him to produce his 
driver’s licence and registration. As the officer spoke 
to the accused he noticed what appeared to be a 
marihuana “joint” behind the passenger’s left ear.  
When the officer asked if there was any marihuana in 
the vehicle, the passenger motioned to the “joint” and 
held it out towards the officer.  The officer then 
directed the accused and his passenger to exit the car, 
arrested them for possession of a controlled 
substance, read them their right to counsel, and 
cautioned them about making statements. The car was 
then searched and the police seized a plastic bag 
containing 76.7 grams of marihuana, a portable scale,  
a notebook containing “score sheet” entries, and a 
plastic bag containing numerous small zip-lock baggies. 
The men were then arrested for possession of a 
controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking 
and again advised of their rights.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the officer 
testified he arrested the vehicle occupants because of 
the marihuana joint in the passenger’s ear, the smell of 
freshly-burnt marihuana, and the passenger stating he 
had marihuana. During the voir dire the accused argued 
the drugs and other evidence should have been 
excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter because police 
breached his rights under s.9 (arbitrary detention) 
when they pulled the car over and when he was 
arrested, and s.8 (unreasonable search or seizure) 
when police searched the vehicle without a warrant. 
The trial judge ruled the accused’s rights were not 
infringed because the officer had “a hunch and 
suspicion based on some objectivity, namely the 
continuing smell of burning marihuana” when he stopped 
the vehicle. This was then elevated to “reasonable and 
probable grounds by virtue of the passenger, who, in 
response to a question of where the smell was coming 
from, had indicated a joint 
above his left ear.” The trial 
judge found the officer had 
reasonable and probable 
grounds that marihuana was 
on the passenger and the 
accused was also arrestable 
because he was in possession 
under s.4(3) of the Criminal 
Code—where one or more 
people with the knowledge and 
consent of the others have 
possession. The Mustang had 
been lawfully searched incidental to the arrests and 
the evidence was admissible. And even if the accused’s 
rights were breached the trial judge would not have 
excluded the evidence under s.24(2) anyway. The 
accused then pled guilty to possessing marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking. 
The accused then appealed the trial judge’s ruling on 
the voir dire to the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
again arguing  he was arbitrarily detained when the 
officer directed him to pull over and stop.  He 
submitted that the odour of freshly-smoked marihuana 
emanating from the car did not provide legal 
justification for the officer’s action.  Instead, he 
suggested  the officer had only a bare suspicion of 
criminal activity which did not meet the threshold for 
an investigative detention. He also contended that 
although there may have been grounds to arrest the 
passenger for possession of marihuana, the officer did 
not have grounds to arrest him. In his view, it could not 
be inferred that he had the requisite knowledge, 
consent, or control over the joint observed in the 
passenger’s personal possession.
The Initial Detention
The three member panel of the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision. Under the 
common law, police officers have the power to detain a 
person for investigation if they have reasonable 
grounds to suspect the detainee is involved in on-going 
criminal activity. “A ‘reasonable’ suspicion means 
something more than a mere suspicion and something 
less than a belief based upon reasonable and probable 
grounds”, said Justice Frankel. He continued:
In my view, the odour of freshly-smoked marihuana 
emanating from a vehicle objectively supports, at a 
“[T]he odour of freshly-smoked 
marihuana emanating from a vehicle 
objectively supports, at a minimum, a 
reasonable suspicion that the driver and/
or passenger are then engaged in 
criminal activity, namely, possession of 
marihuana. It is reasonable to suspect 
that persons who have just used 
marihuana will have more of that drug in 
their possession.”
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minimum, a reasonable suspicion that the driver 
and/or passenger are then engaged in criminal 
activity, namely, possession of marihuana. It is 
reasonable to suspect that persons who have just 
used marihuana will have more of that drug in their 
possession. In addition, when the odour of freshly-
smoked marihuana is emanating from a vehicle, it is 
reasonable to suspect that the driver’s ability to 
operate that vehicle is impaired by a drug, an 
offence contrary to s.253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code 
… In light of this, [the accused] was lawfully 
detained for investigation. [para. 31]
The Arrest
Under s.495(1)(b) of the Criminal Code a peace officer 
may arrest a person found committing a criminal 
offence. This means “the arresting officer must have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be 
arrested is apparently in the process of committing a 
crime in his or her presence”. In this case, the decision 
to arrest the accused “was not based solely on the 
odour of freshly-smoked marihuana emanating from 
the Mustang, but on that odour taken together with 
what appeared to be a marihuana ‘joint’ behind [the 
passenger’s] left ear.”  These factors, in combination, 
objectively supported  the officer’s belief that he had 
come across a crime in progress.
The accused’s submission that the passenger was the 
only person that could be lawfully arrested was also 
rejected. The definition of “possession” in s.4(3) of the 
Criminal Code includes “where one of two or more 
persons, with the knowledge and consent of the rest, 
has anything in his custody or possession, it shall be 
deemed to be in the custody and possession of each and 
all of them.” In holding the accused’s arrest lawful 
Justice Frankel stated:
With respect to deemed possession under s. 
4(3)(b), “there must be knowledge, consent and a 
measure of control on the part of the person 
deemed to be in possession”.  All these elements are 
present with respect to the standard required to 
arrest [the accused] on the basis of “finds 
committing”.
With respect to “knowledge”, given the odour of 
marihuana in the Mustang, it cannot seriously be 
suggested that there is no objective basis to 
support a reasonable belief that [the accused] was 
aware that marihuana had very recently been 
smoked in his vehicle.  Further, and more 
importantly, it cannot seriously be suggested that 
there is no objective support for a reasonable 
belief that [the accused] was aware of the “joint” 
behind [the passenger’s] left ear.
Turning to “consent and control”, what must be kept 
in mind is that for a person to be deemed to be “in 
possession” of an item, he or she need not have in 
fact exercised power over it; all that is required is 
an ability to exercise some power….  
………
…In the context of a voir dire to determine 
whether someone was lawfully arrested on the 
basis of “finds committing”, what the Crown needs 
to establish is that the facts as they appeared to 
the arresting officer, when viewed objectively 
through the lens of common sense, support a 
reasonable belief that the person arrested was in a 
position to exercise some measure of control over 
the item in question.  In my opinion, the facts in this 
case objectively support [the officer’s] belief that 
[the accused] was in a position to exercise some 
measure of control over the marihuana [the 
passenger] openly had in his possession…. 
[references omitted, paras. 40-45]
Since the vehicle occupants were lawfully arrested, the 
police had the common law power to search the 
vehicle’s interior incidental to those arrests to 
determine whether any additional drugs were 
present. Since there were no Charter violations there 
was no need to resort to s.24(2) and the evidence was 
admissible. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
BY THE BOOK:
s.495(1) Criminal Code: Power of Arrest
A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a) a person who has committed an 
indictable offence or who, on reasonable 
grounds, he believes has committed or is 
about to commit an indictable offence;
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal 
offence; or
(c) a person in respect of whom he has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a warrant of arrest or committal, 
in any form set out in Part XXVIII in relation thereto, is in 
force within the territorial jurisdiction in which the person 
is found.
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REASONABLE SUSPICION 
ELEVATED TO REASONABLE 
BELIEF DURING TRAFFIC STOP
R. v. Baddock, 2008 BCCA 48 
A police officer received phone numbers 
for dial-a-dope operations from an 
informant believed to be reliable. The 
officer phoned one of the numbers and 
set up a meet for 15 minutes after the call. A small, 
white car was to attend at a McDonald's restaurant, 
located in a small mall with other stores. Within the 
time expected, the accused and his passenger arrived 
at the McDonald's in a small, white Honda Civic and 
parked in front of it, but neither the driver nor the 
passenger left the vehicle which remained parked for 
about two minutes before leaving. The police officer 
followed the car and pulled it over,  believing its 
occupants were associated with the telephone call he 
had made to the dial-a-dope operation. As the officer 
approached the vehicle he called the dial-a-dope 
number again and noted the accused’s phone was 
vibrating. The accused was arrested and the car was 
searched. Police found cocaine in a coin compartment 
between the steering wheel and the driver's side door 
and underneath a mat in the 
driver's side area of the vehicle.  
During a voir dire in British 
Columbia Supreme Court the 
accused argued there were 
insufficient objective grounds to 
arrest and, at best, only a 
detention and safety search of 
the accused was authorized. As a 
result of the ss.8 and 9 Charter 
breaches, he submitted the evidence should be 
excluded under s.24(2). The trial judge, however, 
concluded the officer had reasonable grounds to make 
the arrest. First, he found the officer subjectively 
believed grounds existed. Second, he ruled the 
necessary objective grounds existed as well. The 
informant's information had face validity because he 
had assisted the police in other investigations.  It was 
also tested this time when the officer phoned the 
number and engaged in a drug transaction. And the 
appearance of the small, white Honda within the time 
expected, parking for a short time without attending 
any of the stores and then driving off added to the 
circumstances implicating the accused. The police were 
authorized to detain the accused and pull the vehicle 
over. Then the suspicion was heightened to reasonable 
and probable grounds on phoning the original number 
that resulted in the drug transaction and the police 
officer's observation of the accused's telephone 
receiving a call. The trial judge concluded the search of 
the vehicle was subsequent to a legal arrest and the 
evidence was admissible. The accused was convicted of 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal contending, in part, that the trial 
judge erred in failing to find his rights under ss. 8 and 
9 of the Charter were violated when his vehicle was 
stopped and searched and in not excluding the 
evidence.  
The “police may detain an individual for investigative 
purposes if there are reasonable grounds to suspect in 
all of the circumstances that the individual is 
connected to a particular crime and that such a 
detention is necessary.” And a lawful arrest in this case 
required the officer have a subjective belief that the 
driver of the vehicle had committed an offence and 
that the officer’s subjective belief was objectively 
reasonable.
Justice Levine, rendering the 
unanimous opinion of the Appeal Court, 
concluded the trial judge did not err in 
finding the police had reasonable 
grounds to detain the accused for 
investigative purposes when they 
pulled him over. Thus, there was no s.9 
breach at the time of the stop. And 
when the officer again called the 
number and the accused’s telephone 
received the call, this elevated the officer’s 
reasonable suspicion to reasonable and probable 
grounds justifying the arrest. This was so even though 
the officer acknowledged that he did not take steps to 
confirm the number he called was in fact connected to 
the accused’s cell phone and it could have been a 
coincidence that he received a call from another 
telephone at the time the officer approached the 
vehicle.
The police may search a vehicle pursuant to a lawful 
arrest where the object or purpose of the search is 
correlated to the reasons or grounds for the arrest. 
“[P]olice may detain an individual 
for investigative purposes if there 
are reasonable grounds to 
suspect in all of the circumstances 
that the individual is connected to 
a particular crime and that such a 
detention is necessary.”
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Since the arrest was lawful, the search for evidence 
following the arrest was also lawful and did not breach 
s.8 of the Charter.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
ROADSIDE PAT-DOWN 
REASONABLE ON BASIS OF 
DRIVER’s VIOLENT BACKGROUND
R. v. Harada, 2008 BCSC 1346
Police saw a vehicle driving at a very low 
rate of speed through an intersection 
shortly before 1:00 am and followed it.  Its 
brake lights flashed several times and the 
vehicle pulled beside the curb, came to a stop, and then 
pulled out onto the street.   The vehicle then pulled 
back beside the curb and came to a stop again.  
Concerned that the driver might be confused and in 
need of assistance, or that the driver might be 
impaired, the officers decided to speak to the 
driver.  The police car came to a stop parallel to the 
vehicle and asked the driver what he was doing. The 
accused said he was coming to 
see a friend and it was noted 
his eyes were glazed over and 
he appeared confused.  
Concerned the accused may 
be impaired, an officer told 
him to wait. The police car was 
backed up and pulled behind 
the accused’s vehicle. An “N” 
sticker that was not properly 
displayed was seen.
The two officers exited the 
police car. One spoke to the 
driver, obtained a driver’s licence showing the accused 
was a new driver, pointed out the improperly displayed 
“N” sticker and asked the accused if he had been 
drinking. The accused replied “No.”   A second officer  
had approached the vehicle on the passenger side and 
noticed an unopened bottle of beer in a pouch on the 
back of the passenger seat.  Both officers returned to 
their police car and decided to require a breath sample 
for an approved screening device (ASD).  The accused’s 
name was checked on the police computer and it was 
learned he was “violent”, as having been involved in a 
violent assault three years earlier and an incident 
where a replica handgun and pellet gun were recovered 
from him shortly before this stop. The accused was 
asked to exit his vehicle and brought back between the 
two vehicles where the ASD demand was read. 
One officer began to prepare the ASD while the other 
asked the accused to remove his hands from his 
pockets and whether he had any weapons or sharp 
objects on him.  He said “no”, but the officer 
nonetheless had safety concerns arising from the 
information received from the police computer.  A pat 
down search was conducted and the officer detected a 
hard object in the accused’s right front pant pocket 
which felt long and hard, like a knife.   When asked 
whether it was a knife the accused said “No, I don’t 
think so.  Let me check,” and he began to reach into his 
pocket.  The officer immediately held the accused’s 
wrist, stopping him form reaching in the pocket. The 
officer then reached into the pocket and withdrew a 
knife. Upon pulling out the knife, the officer loudly said 
“this is a knife” to alert his partner.  The accused was 
taken to the ground for the safety of everyone present 
and handcuffed.  
The knife was examined and 
was determined to be a 
prohibited weapon—its blade 
could be opened by spring 
action after pressing a button. 
He was arrested for possessing 
a prohibited weapon and a 
plastic baggie containing drugs 
was seen on the ground. He was 
then arrested for possessing 
drugs for the purpose of 
trafficking and immediately 
provided his Charter warning.  
The ASD was presented the 
accused but he blew zero.  He was searched and several 
items of drugs were found. In his vehicle police found 
two cell phones, one ringing frequently where 
individuals asked for drugs. He was charged with four 
counts of possession of a controlled substance for the 
purpose of trafficking and a voir dire was held in 
British Columbia Supreme Court to determine if the 
accused’s Charter rights were breached and whether 
the evidence should be excluded under s.24(2) of the 
Charter. He alleged that he had been unlawfully 
detained, given a demand for an approved screening 
“Police in British Columbia have a general 
power to conduct roadside stops of 
vehicles under section 73 of the Motor 
Vehicle Act. The limitation on this power is 
that the stop must be for a traffic related 
purpose such as checking the driver’s 
licence and insurance, the mechanical 
fitness of the vehicle, or the sobriety of the 
driver. The roadside stop may be entirely 
random, but must relate to driving a car.”
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device (ASD) without reasonable suspicion, and then 
unreasonably subjected to a pat down search followed 
by an illegal search of his pocket.
The Stop
In determining that the police were entitled to initially 
stop the vehicle under provincial legislation, which 
rendered the stop lawful and therefore did not a 
breach of s.9 of the Charter, Justice Dillon stated:
Police in British Columbia have a general power to 
conduct roadside stops of vehicles under section 73 
of the Motor Vehicle Act. The limitation on this 
power is that the stop must be for a traffic related 
purpose such as checking the driver’s licence and 
insurance, the mechanical fitness of the vehicle, or 
the sobriety of the driver. The roadside stop may 
be entirely random, but must relate to driving a car.
Police stopped [the accused’s] vehicle in the early 
morning hours on Sunday after observing erratic 
driving that led officers to question whether the 
driver was just lost or was possibly inebriated.  [An 
officer] then decided to do a proper vehicle stop 
and noticed that the N sticker, required to be 
apparent on the vehicles driven by all new drivers, 
was not completely visible.   A new driver is not 
allowed to have any alcohol in his body when driving. 
 [The second officer] had noticed glazed eyes and 
confusion that led him to consider that a sobriety 
check was necessary.  Consequently, police told [the 
accused] to wait.  All of this was authorized under 
the Motor Vehicle Act. [references omitted, paras. 
17-18]
The ASD Demand
The judge also concluded the officers were entitled to 
demand the accused provide a breath sample for 
analysis by the ASD. Section 254(2) of the Criminal 
Code allows a demand to be made for roadside 
screening device if there are reasonable grounds to 
suspect, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
that the driver has alcohol in his body.  In 
this case, the police had a proper basis to 
reasonably suspect the accused had 
alcohol in his body. Although neither 
officer smelled alcohol on the accused’s 
breath, they both testified they had a 
suspicion that he had alcohol in his body. 
“The manner of driving suggested that 
the driver did not know what he was 
doing, the driver was observed to have a glazed and 
confused look, there was a bottle of beer within reach 
of the driver, it was early morning after a Saturday 
night, and the driver was under a requirement to have 
consumed no alcohol,” said Justice Dillon. “In all of 
these circumstances, I conclude that there existed 
the basis for a reasonable suspicion so that the ASD 
demand was lawful.”
  
And bringing the accused back to the police vehicle to 
administer the ASD, instead of doing it at the side of 
his car as he suggested, did not take the detention 
outside the ambit of minimal intrusion. He was within 
five meters of his car and there was no time delay. 
Further, there was no evidence moving the accused to 
the rear of his car was a fishing expedition so he could 
be patted down for the ulterior purpose of searching 
for drugs.  
The Search
The pat down search of the accused was also 
reasonable. The officer was concerned for safety in 
light of the information received from the police 
database that classified the accused as violent with a 
recent incident involving replica weapons. “A police 
officer is entitled to conduct a pat down search when 
he has reason to believe that his safety is at risk,” said 
Justice Dillon. “The reasonableness of the pat down 
search is to be determined on the totality of the 
circumstances”:
Here, there was recent information that [the 
accused] was violent or potentially violent. This 
information was not contested. Although [the 
accused] denied that he had a weapon and was 
otherwise cooperative, [the officer] was not acting 
solely on a hunch when he decided that a pat down 
was necessary to ensure his safety.  He had reason 
to believe that he was dealing with a potentially 
dangerous individual just after midnight. In R. v. 
Mann …the court said that officer cannot act solely 
on a hunch, but must respond based upon reasonable 
and specific inferences drawn 
from known facts. The officer 
was not conducting a fishing 
expedition here with the 
information at hand.
The officer then conducted a 
pat down search for this 
reason and discovered a hard 
long object that caused him 
“[The officer] was not acting solely 
on a hunch when he decided that 
a pat down was necessary to 
ensure his safety.  He had reason 
to believe that he was dealing 
with a potentially dangerous 
individual just after midnight”
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concern. He asked the accused if he had a knife and 
was given an uncertain answer. This raised further 
concern for safety as the accused had now basically 
denied that he had weapons twice and the officer 
was faced with a reasonable inference that the 
accused had a knife.
The search progressed beyond the pat down once 
the officer felt what he thought was a knife, the 
accused was ambivalent as to whether it was a knife, 
and then the accused moved to reach into his 
pocket.  The pocket search … was warranted by the 
officer’s feeling of a hard object that he thought 
could be a knife in a situation that was not based 
upon mere curiosity. The officer had a reason to go 
beyond the pat down search.  I conclude that the 
officer had a reasonable basis to reach into [the 
accused’s] pocket.
The aftermath of discovery of the knife and the 
conclusion that it was a prohibited weapon was to 
place the accused on the ground.   When he was 
raised to his feet, the officer told him that he was 
under arrest for possession of a prohibited weapon 
and moved towards the police car.   The baggie 
containing drugs was then discovered where the 
accused had been on the ground.  He was then told 
that he was under arrest for possession of drugs 
for the purpose of trafficking and was given the 
Charter warning.   The search of the vehicle 
subsequent to arrest was not challenged. [paras. 
26-29]
The seizure of the knife and drugs was lawful and 
there were no Charter breaches. And even if the 
accused’s rights were violated the judge would have 
admitted the evidence under s.24(2). The evidence was 
admitted and the accused was convicted on three 
counts of possessing a controlled substance for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
NEW YEARS RESOLUTIONS
Insp. Kelly Keith, Atlantic Police Academy
      
Well pretty soon the gyms will be 
full of people that made news 
years resolutions. I never liked  
going to the gym at this time of 
year because it was busy and 
there were long waits at some of 
the equipment. On the positive 
side,  I knew it would only last for 
about 3 weeks and then 90 % of the people that 
started will have quit.  Let’s take a look at some of the 
key factors to keep you motivated to train!
Goals – You need to ensure that you make each day 
count!!!   Going to the gym without a plan is like getting 
your car on the road and knowing your destination but 
having no idea how to get there. You need to set both 
short term – one month goals and long term 6-12 month 
goals. The goals MUST be achievable. Then reward 
yourself when you achieve them. Each and every time 
you go to the gym you should know in advance what it is 
you’re going to do once you get there. This being said, 
if a piece of equipment is being used or you go to 
another gym, simply do another exercise that works 
that same muscle part. If the barbells are all being 
used, just change to dumbbells. Surround yourself with 
reminders; reminders that will motivate you each day 
to get to the gym. Entering into some type of 
competition is what I generally need to keep motivated.  
Nutrition – This is a monster piece of the equation.  
In order to achieve any goals you may have set, you will 
need to ensure that your nutrition is in-line with your 
goals. A key to success is cleaning out your fridge and 
cupboards of anything that is not consistent with your 
goals. You will need to ensure you eat 5-6 meals a day 
and include a clean variety of protein and 
carbohydrates (fats usually take care of themselves in 
the carbohydrates and protein you eat). After a hard 
workout try to eat a clean portion of carbohydrates 
and protein to enhance your recovery for the next 
workout. Last, but not least, you must go to the gym 
with some fuel – FOOD - in your tank. Ensure you at 
least have pre-workout food approximately 30 – 60 
minutes before you go to the gym. Many people have 
“cheat” days where they allow themselves to indulge 
once per week in whatever they wish. Again, the key to 
this is not to have these foods in the house for the rest 
of the week.
Injury Prevention – Injuries will set you back and 
can even be the tipping point in failing to meet your goal 
- quitting. Ensure you raise your body temperature and 
warm-up before going hard. Also, ensure that you 
stretch at the end of your workout to increase the 
range of motion and decrease soreness. Increase the 
strength in your stability muscles that often get 
overlooked. Finally, take a break from training when you 
need to.
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Success – Change your program often. Don’t be afraid 
to shock your body! For example, if you generally do 
three sets of eight repetitions of a certain exercise 
throw in a day where you do three sets of 15 – 20 
repetitions.  Keep everything fresh and your tempo high.
Rest – If you workout hard you must rest hard!  The 
harder you workout the more sleep you will require.  If 
you truly want success do not skip this step!
As Benjamin Franklin said: “By failing to prepare, you 
are preparing to fail!”  Start Preparing!
About the Author - Insp. Kelly Keith is a 20 year 
veteran of law enforcement. He presently teaches 
Physical Training, Use of Force and Tactical Firearms 
to Corrections, Law and Security, Conservation 
Officers and Police Cadets at the Atlantic Police 
Academy. Kelly is a second degree black belt in Jiu-
Jitsu and a Certified Personal Trainer, Strength and 
Conditioning Instructor, and a Certified Sports 
Nutrition Specialist. He can be reached by email at 
KKeith@pei.sympatico.ca 
‘IN SERVICE’ 
LEGAL ROAD TEST ANSWERS
1. (a) Stabbing—see Homicide By The Numbers (at p. 
6 of this publication). 
2. (d) Manitoba—see Homicide By The Numbers (at p. 
6 of this publication). 
3. (b) False—see R. v. Andrews et al. (at p. 21 of this 
publication). 
4. (a) True—see R. v. Restau (at p. 23 of this 
publication). 
5. (a) True—see R. v. Webster (at p. 24 of this 
publication). 
MAXIMUM SENTENCE DID NOT 
REQUIRE ‘WORST OFFENDER, 
WORST OFFENCE’
R. v. Solowan, 2008 SCC 62
The accused pled guilty in British 
Columbia Provincial Court to three 
offences and was sentenced as follows; 
take auto without consent (three 
months), possess stolen property (six months), and fail 
to stop for police (six months). The possession offence 
and the fail to stop were both hybrid offences for 
which the Crown elected to proceed summarily. The six 
month sentence given for these offences was the 
maximum sentence permissible under the law. In total, 
the accused was sentenced to 15 months.
His argument to the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
that he received the maximum six month sentence for 
a summary proceeding without being found to be the 
worst offender committing the worst offence was 
rejected. The Court of Appeal  held that the accused 
had not been subject to the maximum sentence because 
the offences had not been proceeded by indictment. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal found the sentence 
of 15 months excessive and reduced the possession 
charge sentence to three months. This resulted in a 
global sentence of 12 months - not 15. The accused 
then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In a unanimous judgment, the Supreme Court held that 
the imposition of a maximum sentence is not 
constrained by the “worst offender, worst offence” 
scenario. Instead, a maximum sentence may otherwise 
be appropriate, considering the principles of 
sentencing set out in the Criminal Code, including the 
principle of proportionality and imposition of the least 
restrictive sanction. 
However, the Supreme Court noted it would be an error 
in law to conclude the fitness of a sentence imposed for 
a hybrid offence proceeded summarily is to be 
considered against the maximum sentence available had 
the Crown elected to proceed by indictment:
A fit sentence for a hybrid offence is neither a 
function nor a fraction of the sentence that might 
have been imposed had the Crown elected  to 
proceed otherwise than it did. More particularly, 
the sentence for a hybrid offence prosecuted 
summarily should not be “scaled down” from the 
maximum on summary conviction simply because the 
defendant would likely have received less than the 
maximum had he or she been prosecuted by 
indictment.  Likewise, upon indictment, the sentence 
should not be “scaled up” from the sentence that 
the accused might well have received if prosecuted 
by summary conviction. [para. 15]
Rather, the Criminal Code sentencing principles apply to 
both indictable and summary offences and a court is 
bound by the Crown’s election in determining the 
appropriate punishment. The British Columbia Court of 
Appeal’s decision was affirmed. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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